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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a new technique to obfuscate an authentication-challenge program (named LocProg) using randomly 
generated data together with a client's current location in real-time. LocProg can be used to enable any handset-
application on mobile-devices (e.g. mCommerce on Smartphones) that requires authentication with a remote 
authenticator (e.g. bank). The motivation of this novel technique is to a) enhance the security against replay attacks, 
which is currently based on using real-time nonce(s),  and b) add a new security factor, which is location verified by two 
independent sources, to challenge / response methods for authentication. To assure a secure-live transaction, thus 
reducing the possibility of replay and other remote attacks, the authors have devised a novel technique to obtain the 
client's location from two independent sources of GPS on the client's side and the cellular network on authenticator's 
side.  The algorithm of LocProg is based on obfuscating "random elements plus a client's data" with a location-based 
key, generated on the bank side. LocProg is then sent to the client and is designed so it will automatically integrate into 
the target application on the client's handset. The client can then de-obfuscate LocProg if s/he is within a certain range 
around the location calculated by the bank and if the correct personal data is supplied. LocProg also has features to 
protect against trial/error attacks. Analysis of LocAuth's security (trust, threat and system models) and trials based on a 
prototype implementation (on Android platform) prove the viability and novelty of LocAuth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of Smartphones to perform applications requiring client's authentication and secure environment (e.g. financial 
transactions) are increasing rapidly. In the US, for example, over 10 million clients used Smartphones for mobile 
banking in Q4/2010. This represents an increase of 120% from the year before [1]. However, because Smartphones are 
easily lost or stolen, reliable authentication and data protection are still major concerns in mobile applications, because 
PIN & chip used for authentication are open for hackers. As a result, financial companies restrict access, on average, to 
70% of possible services to their clients via mobile apps [2]. Thus this paper focuses on securing the application as an 
added security prior to the actual agreed authentication between the two parties. 
Authentication schemes are traditionally categorised into 3 groups [3]: knowledge-based (e.g. PIN), object-based (e.g. 
token) and identity-based (e.g. biometrics). Recently, further factors like “when (time) and where you are (location)” [4] 
have been proposed to strengthen the security of authentication systems. Smartphones are well suited for multi-factor 
authentication applications because they feature a variety of sensors / receivers to collect any required authentication 
data, e.g. camera to capture the user’s face, or a GPS receiver to determine current location and time. 
Like other location-based multi-factor authentication schemes, the motivation behind LocAuth is, therefore, to restore 
some of the traditional face-to-face security characteristics missing in mobile transactions in a robust mechanism offered 
by obfuscation. Thus simulating the “good old” office-based authentication where the authenticator has the guarantee 
that the contract is signed by the known client at that particular place and moment in time. This eliminates attackers from 
pretending to be at a certain location as well as re-using previously gathered data of a genuine client. 
 
 
 
 
The LocAuth scheme combines personal client data (e.g. PIN, to assure the genuine client), a stored Key-on-Phone 
(KoP, to ensure the correct device) with location and wireless communication properties (e.g. GPS / Serving cellular 
tower) to assure the client’s position in real-time as well as randomly created nonce(s) to prevent replay attacks. LocAuth 
can be added to any existing mobile applications such as [5]. To make LocAuth more secure, the client’s Smartphone 
location is independently determined on the authenticator side via the cellular network operator that serves the 
Smartphone using tower-based localisation techniques [6]. In contrast, at the client side, the location necessary to 
respond correctly to the bank’s challenge is determined via the GPS receiver onboard the client's Smartphone. Therefore, 
if these two locations are within a certain range, and the client also provides the correct personal data, then the correct 
de-obfuscation key is generated. 
The overhead and offered-security of LocAuth is analysed to assure its viability. LocAuth is tested by a prototype 
implementation on the Android platform (used in most Smartphones). Real GPS location and tower triangulation 
measurements in London are used in the experiments. This helped proving the concept and testing the practicality and 
accuracy of the location-key generation used. The obfuscated-program is designed to always run and terminate correctly, 
but shall calculate a wrong result when an incorrect key is used. This property is important for challenge/response 
techniques as it eliminates possible “try-and-error” attacks, because an attacker cannot decide, if the calculated result is 
correct. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related work in software protection 
based on obfuscated interpretation as well as location-based security. Section 3 describes the concept of LocAuth, and 
section 4 illustrates the implementation, trials and security analysis. Section 5 concludes the achievements and outlines 
future work. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1 Obfuscated interpretation and software protection 
Software obfuscation [7] techniques protect a software program against unauthorised modifications. Software 
obfuscation makes it more difficult for an attacker to understand and change a program, for example through control 
flow obfuscation [8]. 
The first obfuscated interpretation [9] implemented a finite state machine (FSM) having a set of transition rules to 
convert the original program's instructions into new varied instructions which have no static relationship to the original 
ones. During program execution / interpretation, the obfuscated instructions are converted back into the original 
instructions based on a key. Therefore, an attacker is unable to understand the real semantics of the obfuscated program, 
even if the attacker has access to the code. This idea was then extended by introducing a software implemented 
permutation-based interpreter (PMI) that can be changed much easier [10].  
The PMI framework was further extended by the oBiometrics software protection scheme [5] were the PMI key is 
replaced with a biometric generated key, thus removing the necessity of encrypting the permutation rules as well as 
securely-hiding the permutation interpreter and also tightly bound the program to the genuine user. 
2.2 Location-based security and encryption techniques 
Location proofs enable applications to check the current location of the user [11]. A proof can be a piece of data 
generated by a known and trusted sender (e.g. WiFi Access Point) that can be sent to the Smartphone on request. The 
Smartphone stores the received proof for immediate or later use and attaches it to a message in the case a location-proof 
is required. An example of such secure localisation and certification service that tags digital content, e.g. photos or 
communication messages with a location and time stamp was proposed in [12]. Other possible methods to determine the 
Smartphone position include GPS or WiFi-AP and were proposed for example in [13]. 
In contrast to LocAuth, these methods, as a first step, calculate the location on the Smartphone, and then, as a second 
step, the claimed location is verified by the receiver. A drawback of these techniques is that the location proof is stored 
on the Smartphone and thus, exposed to a malicious user. LocAuth overcomes this potential security problem because 
the LocAuth challenge is generated completely independent from the position determined by the user. The challenge 
location is based only on information received from the trusted network operator, as described in the trust model in 
section 3. 
 
 
 
 
GeoEncryption [14] is a similar approach to LocAuth. This extends a classic hybrid cryptographic algorithm with a 
GeoLock functionality to ensure the location binding. Instead, GeoEncryption allows the message receiver to open 
(decrypt) the message only if the receiver's location is inside the required area. A practical mapping technique to convert 
a location to a unique key for the GeoEncryption was later described in [15]. 
3. CONCEPT AND SYSTEM/TRUST MODEL OF LOCATION-OBFUSCATED 
SOFTWARE PROTECTION 
eCommerce and mobile banking are two typical applications targeted by this solution. LocAuth system model comprises 
4 parties; a) the application provider (MAP) such as a bank who offers a service, b) the genuine client who uses the 
offered service and who has a previously established business relationship to MAP, c) the attacker who illegitimately 
wants to use the service, and d) the cellular mobile network operator (MO) who services the genuine client Smartphone 
and also communicates the genuine client Smartphone location to the MAP. This paper considers the following threat 
and trust model between the involved parties. The genuine client trusts MAP and MO. MAP trusts MO to determine and 
report the correct location of the genuine client Smartphone. I.e. this paper assumes a contractual relationship between 
MAP and MO. MO also trusts MAP in such a way, that MAP will not use the received client location for any fraudulent 
activities, i.e. breaches the client’s location privacy. To protect the client’s privacy, privacy preserving location 
verification techniques can be added to LocAuth [16]. MAP does not trust the location determined on the client side. 
LocAuth authentication scheme starts on the client side by using the oBiometrics secured service [5] provided by the 
authenticator (Figure 1). The client starts the "protected application" on their Smartphone. A biometric key is then 
generated from a freshly captured biometrics and used to de-obfuscate the oBiometrics secured application.  
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Figure 1. LocAuth algorithm for Location-Obfuscated Software Protection 
If the fresh biometric feature vector of the client is correct, the biometric-obfuscation program interpretation is successful 
and an initial message is send to the authenticator. Upon receiving this message, the authenticator requests the current 
 
 
 
 
location of the client’s Smartphone, including the cell-ID used to serve this client's handset, from the MO. A fresh 
LocProg is then generated which is location-obfuscated by a key based on this client's location. LocProg contains 
random elements such as nonce(s), dynamic changing values known independently to both sides (e.g. cell-ID) and client 
data enrolled with the bank (e.g. PIN and a stored Key-on-Phone, KoP). These random elements act as multi-factors to 
prevent replay attacks and to assure the real-time (i.e. the response will only be accepted by the authenticator within a 
short time span, e.g. 5 seconds) and one-time property of this challenge. These dynamically changing values, together 
with the enrolled client data, also guarantee that only the genuine user with his own mobile device can calculate the 
correct response as discussed in the security analysis in section 4.3. 
The obfuscation key is generated as described in section 4.1. The obfuscated LocProg is then sent back to the client. The 
application on the client's side receives the fresh LocProg and dynamically integrates it into the oBiometrics flow. After 
the client enters his PIN, the stored KoP is retrieved from the Smartphone memory or SIM card, and the current location 
of the Smartphone is determined by the GPS receiver onboard the handset, i.e. the client determines his location 
completely independent from the technique employed by the bank. The used cell-ID is then identified and the associated 
location-key is calculated. For correct calculation of the same location-key, LocAuth requires the client to be static or 
slow-moving during the process. The calculated key is then used to de-obfuscate the challenge interpretation and PIN, 
KoP and cell-ID become parameters to this LocProg. If the correct location key, PIN, KoP and cell-ID are used, i.e. the 
client is within a certain area around the location determined by the authenticator; the client is able to calculate the 
correct response. The correct response proofs to the challenger that the Smartphone is inside the correct area (location 
proof), that the response was calculated in real-time (nonce, dynamic changing value) by the genuine client (PIN) and 
Smartphone (KoP). If successful, the authenticator verifies the response and continues the transaction, otherwise 
authentication is rejected. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
4.1 Key Generation for Location-Obfuscated Interpretation 
The correct interpretation of the received location-based challenge requires, on the client side, the corresponding de-
obfuscation keyDe-Obf to the obfuscation keyObf, used by the authenticator to create LocProg. To test the viability of 
LocAuth, location measurements (longitude and latitude values) were taken by the authors in London. Entries 1-6 in 
table 1 show some of these real measurements, for illustration. Entries 7-8 (shaded) are added intentionally as wrong 
control locations to reflect an attack on LocAuth that should result in being identified and rejected by the authenticator 
because the client (attacker) does not use / know the real location of the Smartphone. 
Table 1. Location measurements in London. 
  GPS-based location (LC) Tower-based location (LA) 
  Lat M (deg) Lon M (deg) Lat T (deg) Lon T (deg) PV (m) 
Distance between 
LC and LA, meter (LE) 
Cell-ID 
1 51.4977 0.0080 51.497 0.007 300 104 53209247 
2 51.5142 -0.1486 51.514 -0.147 200 113 48627332 
3 51.5131 -0.1419 51.512 -0.139 500 235 48626504 
4 51.5127 -0.1468 51.514 -0.147 100 145 48627332 
5 51.5138 -0.1439 51.513 -0.140 400 284 55171098 
6 51.5083 -0.1509 51.509 -0.151 100 78 48627465 
7 51.50200 -0.0013 51.498 -0.010 300 749 53416308 
8 51.48620 0.1105 51.490 0.120 300 782 54732850 
 
An HTC-Android Smartphone was used to determine the client’s Smartphone geographical location via the onboard GPS 
receiver (LC in Table I). Simultaneously, the mobile phone tracking service "FollowUs” was used to determine the 
Smartphone location independently via cellular network triangulation on the authenticator side (LA). The resultant 
localisation error LE (distance between LC, LA), coming from the different accuracy of the two methods, is between 78 
and 284 meters, with an average error of 160 meters for the genuine measurements. In addition to the location, the MO 
provides a proximity value (PV) to the authenticator (this PV expresses the confidence that the MO has in its own 
 
 
 
 
localisation. I.e. the MO believes that the Smartphone is inside a circle around the provided location LA with a radius 
equal to PV). The last column “Cell-ID” describes the basestation currently used in the communication process between 
client and MO and can be independently determined on both sides. On the client side, the cell-ID can be directly 
accessed via an Android system call. On the authenticator side, the cell-ID will be provided in addition to the location 
and PV by the MNO. 
Correct interpretation of the received location-based challenge requires, on the client side, the corresponding de-
obfuscation key “Key-LocDe-Obf“ to the obfuscation key “Key-LocObf”, used by the authenticator to create LocProg. To 
calculate the location-based key of the client’s Smartphone at the client and bank side, for example, a location grid with 
size S and a unique key (K1 to Kn) associated with every grid intersection is used (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Location grid for key generation 
The client and bank, for this example, use the key nearest to the determined (client) respectively requested (bank) 
location to (de-)obfuscate the program. This method always results in the same key on both sides, if a) the bank localises 
the client inside one of the “non-critical areas” around the intersections and b) the client is genuine and therefore less 
than the distance R away from the cellular based location LA. Based on this example calculated error, shown in Table I, 
the circle around LA with radius R describes the tolerance area for a client's position to be deemed as genuine. 
In the experiments, a tolerance circle of R=300meters is used (this is because the FCC911 regulation which requires that 
network operators can locate Smartphones within an accuracy of 300 meters in 95% of all requests). So, if the MO 
returns a high confidence in his measurement, i.e. the PV is smaller than the default tolerance of 300 meters; the PV is 
used as the tolerance distance R. If LA is outside the “non-critical areas”, the genuine client might use the wrong key 
because the client is actually closer to another intersection as illustrated by the gray shaded areas in Figure 2.  
To solve the problem of wrong key selection, the bank will accept challenge responses based on more than one key (e.g. 
K1 and K2 in Figure 2) if the result of the probability function (1) is smaller than a pre-defined threshold T. D{X,Y} 
expresses in Figure 2 and (1) the distance between the determined location and the middle of the grid area in the vertical 
(DX), respectively horizontal (DY) direction. 
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Note that accepting more than one key means that the area in which the genuine client needs to be is extended. In 
contrast, K3 will not be accepted by the bank in Figure 2, as the probability (gray shaded area below the middle line) is 
smaller than the threshold T. If LA is near to the centre of the grid, the challenge result based on all four keys (K1 to K4) 
will be accepted by the bank.  In our trials, the (de-)obfuscation keys were calculated similar to the method described in 
[17]. The latitude / longitude values of the nearest grid intersection, PIN, KoP and cell-ID are combined as shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Key generation process for measurement 1  
The combination is then hashed (e.g. MD5) and used as the key to (de-)obfuscate LocProg. Note that the cell-ID acts as a 
dynamic changing value and is used together with the client identifying PIN and KoP to increase the possible hash-
function input value range and therefore strengthens the security and key-space of the LocAuth key. 
Table 2 shows the generated client / bank keys for the 8 location measurements of Table 1. The used grid size is S=500 
meters and the probability threshold is T = 0.95. 
Table 2. Generated client and bank keys in trials. 
  
Prob 
PX 
Prob 
PY 
Client 
Key 
Bank 
Key1 
Bank 
Key2 
Bank 
Key3 
Bank 
Key4 
Key 
ok 
1 0.89 0.57 17675 .. 8170a .. d1cc0 .. 17675 .. da280 .. True 
2 0.69 0.89 fa008 .. f66ad .. fa008 .. d1ebb .. b7781 .. True 
3 0.72 0.71 e8a75 .. 44595 .. e8a75 .. 65a63 .. 79ccb .. True 
4 0.89 1.00 f66ad .. f66ad .. fa008 ..     True 
5 0.60 0.89 19baa .. 1375b .. 19baa .. 187a5 .. ce489 .. True 
6 1.00 1.00 d6030 .. d6030 ..       True 
7 0.60 0.61 e6bdf .. 0cb34 .. 198d8 .. 0e007 .. 9599a .. False 
8 0.60 0.79 37f75 .. c727a .. 31e87 .. d9827 .. b376e .. False 
 
In the first row, both probability values (0.89 and 0.57) are below T (i.e. the client is near the grid cell centre) and the 
bank will accept the de-obfuscated responses based on all four surrounding keys. The client actually uses the key 
corresponding to Bank Key3 (shaded) for the response. In row 6, the client location is determined by the bank in the non-
 
 
 
 
critical area (both probabilities are 1) and only one key is calculated. As the client uses the same key, the client’s 
response will be considered as genuine. In the last two control data rows (7, 8); the response is not accepted by the bank 
as the client is too far away from the claimed location and therefore calculates a wrong key and a wrong LocProg result. 
4.2 Location-Obfuscated Prototype Implementation 
A prototype of LocAuth was developed and tested on the Android platform. The Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) which 
interprets all user applications running on Android Smartphones was changed to interpret LocAuth applications. The 
adapted DVM source code was re-compiled to test the viability of the prototype implementation. The integration of 
LocProg is done on the user application level once the client receives the challenge. Java annotations are used to 
distinguish between oBiometrics byte-code instructions (biometric-obfuscated) and instructions of LocProg (location-
obfuscated) inside the DVM, e.g. “@Obfuscate(type=loc)”. The DVM employs the correct de-obfuscation key (coming 
from fresh GPS location or biometric data) based on the annotation type during the interpretation. An example of a 
LocProg for Android Smartphones based on an integer equation is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Example of challenge-program for Android Smartphones 
The bank generates a random LocProg challenge-program and obfuscates the operators based on the location key. 
LocProg includes random elements (nonce, e.g. Integers), personal client data (getPIN(2, 5), to integrate the second and 
fifth digit of the PIN), the KoP token (getKoP()), and the dynamic shared value (getCellID(1, 6-8), which combines the 
digits 1, 6, 7 and 8 of the cell-ID into one integer). 
As the operator substitutions must be within the same byte-code group (e.g. integer arithmetic: add-int, sub-int, …) to 
pass the byte-code verification of the DVM, all combinations for this group are expressed by n11. Note that “n” 
corresponds to the number of operations in LocProg and the number of operators in the group is 11. For example, six 
operations in the above example would already lead to 1.77*106 possible combinations. 
4.3 Security and Performance Analysis 
The following aspects were taken into consideration to assure that LocAuth security satisfies the application needs, yet 
remain practical with minimum overhead. 
1. The tight combination of LocAuth with oBiometrics forces an attacker to breach all 5 authentication factors 
(biometrics, current location, PIN, KoP, and cell-ID) to gain access to the protected application. The experimental 
results of key generation for oBiometrics are discussed in detail in [5]. Integration of the current Smartphone 
location eliminates distance attacks because an attacker is not able to pretend to be at a different place. PIN and cell-
ID are used as additional changing authentication factors in LocProg, thus increasing the possible key-space to make 
brute-force attacks more difficult. Furthermore, the use of two independent sources to compare the location of the 
client adds strength to the location authentication factor of LocAuth. This technique thus offer qualified level of 
security tailored to such Smartphone based applications yet offering advantage over current authentication 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
2. To achieve a uniform distribution of the possible response values, and hence reduce the probability that the correct 
response could be guessed easily or discovered through a brute-force attack, LocProg must avoid certain 
combinations of operators and values. For example, LocProg should never have only multiplications with one value 
equal to 0. This combination would always lead to the final value of 0, regardless of the other values used. 
3. LocProg is designed to always terminate correctly. If an incorrect key is entered, then a wrong result is generated. 
This “no-crash” property is important to eliminate locally performed “try-and-error” attacks because the attacker 
could conclude on its own that the wrong key was used and try other location keys until LocProg terminates 
correctly. To implement this, LocProg uses Integer arithmetic based on signed 32 bit values resulting in 4.29*109 
possible keys that make it infeasible for an attacker to guess the correct response value. If an arithmetic operation 
causes an overflow, no exception is raised and the program continues normally (i.e. without crash). 
4. Execution of LocAuth introduces computational overhead. Each obfuscated instruction requires additional 
computing cycles to be de-obfuscated and then interpreted. However, as the number of total instructions in LocProg 
is small compared to the surrounding application with thousands of byte-code instructions, the overhead is 
negligible. In our trials, and in comparison with time consumed by running current authentication processes, we 
concluded that no performance degradation was noticeable. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In conclusion, this paper proposes the integration of a randomly generated, location-obfuscation, real-time challenge 
program into authentication based applications on mobile devices. LocAuth can be combined with oBiometrics software 
protection to securely authenticate a genuine client in all kinds of mobile security related transactions (mobile banking 
etc.) using enhanced mobile-devices like Smartphones. The integration of location as an additional, real-time, 
authentication factor, which is independently determined via two different sources on the client and authenticator sides, 
ensures a secure-live transaction and reduces the possibility of replay attacks. The challenge and calculated response 
using this technique can also be combined with other authentication factors (e.g. biometrics) to enhance the security of 
the authentication further. 
The viability of the scheme is tested on the Android emulator. The Dalvik VM is adapted to interpret biometric- and 
location-obfuscated applications. The practicality of LocAuth is verified with actual geographical location measurements 
using Android-based Smartphones. A possible key generation approach to establish the same location-based (de-
)obfuscation key on both the client and the authenticator sides completely independent from each other is described. An 
obfuscated challenge-program for Android mobile-devices based on integer arithmetic is also proposed. The 
implementation of the challenge-program is designed to “not-crash” when the incorrect authentication data is collected. 
This eliminates possible “try-and-error” attacks as an attacker can never be sure if the calculated result is correct. 
Work on the location-obfuscated software protection scheme is ongoing. Future versions of the LocAuth scheme will 
incorporate other methods to independently determine the some location-based key. This shall reduce the possibility of 
wrong key selection on the client side and therefore enhance the accuracy and security of LocAuth. In addition, more 
sophisticated location-obfuscated challenge-programs will be developed. These programs will not only contain 
obfuscated operations based on the location, but also include other factors (e.g. time or velocity) in the obfuscated 
challenge / response program. Furthermore, these programs can protect the location privacy of the client using privacy 
preserving location verification (PPLV) [16]. PPLV allows establishing location based keys without revealing the actual 
physical location of the client to the authenticator. The authors are also investigating a dynamic scheme to ensure that the 
authentication sequence varies for every individual authentication. I.e. current authentication schemes typically follow a 
fixed sequence of steps at both sides. 
Integration of a dynamically changing sequence of the authentication steps will prevent successful authentication of an 
attacker even if the personal data of the genuine client has been compromised. The proposal is to use an obfuscated 
sequence program to pass on the authentication sequence of the client’s data used at that instance in time between the 
two parties (authenticator and client).  
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